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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to tell the complete story, from creation to termination to litigation, of the
Merck Pharmaceutical Company drug, Vioxx. This paper will explain the type of drug Vioxx is and the
way in which it was tested by researchers. It will outline the FDA drug review and approval process and
brieﬂy consider the debate between accelerated and traditional drug approval guidelines. It will then discuss
the actions taken by the FDA in its review of Vioxx in 1999. It will paint a picture of the actions and
negotiations which took place between Merck and the FDA after approval. Then it will discuss the decision
by Merck to voluntarily withdrawal Vioxx from the market. It will then consider the ramiﬁcations of the
withdrawal including the SEC and DOJ investigations, Congressional inquiry, and civil litigation. Finally,
the paper will examine the pending litigation regarding Vioxx to determine the existence of themes and
strategies in those cases as well as Merck’s future post litigation.
Introduction
1Robert Ernst was not your average 59 year old.1 Ernst ran three to ﬁve miles a day. He competed in a
number of Texas races including several marathons. In addition to his love of running, Robert Ernst was an
avid bicyclist as well as a ﬁtness class instructor. He met his wife Carol in 1997 at the gym where he worked
in Cleburne, Texas.2 The couple enjoyed staying physically active together. In April 2001, Carol and Robert
teamed up to take part in the Beauty and the Beast bicycle tour, a six mile ride through Tyler, Texas.
While Robert had been both a smoker and a drinker, he kicked both habits almost twenty years earlier. His
only health complaint was doctor diagnosed tendonitis in his hand. He ﬁrst treated the pain with ibuprofen.3
Then in the fall of 2000, after a visit to his doctor, Robert switched to Vioxx to treat the pain in his hand.
Carol said that taking Vioxx was much easier for her husband. Instead of taking multiple ibuprofen tablets,
he needed to only take one 25 mg Vioxx pill each day.4 And for a long time, Robert appeared to suﬀer no
“adverse reaction” to the drug.5
Then one afternoon about six months after he began taking Vioxx, Robert complained to Carol that his
pulse rate seemed slower than usual after he ﬁnished his daily run. That night, May 6, 2001, after the couple
had dinner at Olive Garden, watched some television, and went to bed, Robert’s breathing slowed to a very
abnormal rate.6 Carol called 911 and Robert was rushed to Harris Methodist Walls Regional Hospital. He
never regained consciousness.7
1Kevin McCoy, Merck to Face First Vioxx Trial Before Texas Jury Next Month, USA Today. June 29, 2005.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
2The autopsy report concluded that Robert Ernst died of “cardiac arrhythmia secondary to coronary atheroscle-
rosis.”8 Carol Ernst found Robert’s death to be a mystery; she could not believe her physically active husband
could have died from a heart problem. So she began to investigate the possible causes. Eventually, she turned
her investigation to Vioxx. Almost immediately, Carol came across a report linking several deaths in Great
Britain to the pain killer.9
Carol became convinced that it was Vioxx that killed her husband. It was her belief that Merck & Company,
the manufacturer of Vioxx was aware of the cardiovascular risks associated with the drug. She stated, “if
they [Merck] had addressed those problems, Bob would still be here.10 Carol Ernst sued Merck in 2002 in
Brazoria County District Court in the state of Texas. The case against Merck was considered weak because
in all the studies of Vioxx, the drug had not been linked to heart rhythm irregularities like the one Robert
Ernst died from. But the coroner who performed the autopsy testiﬁed that there was a likelihood that
Robert could have died of a blood clot not originally identiﬁed. Because she was unaware that Vioxx caused
blood clots, the coroner stated that she did not thoroughly consider that cause of death when performing
the autopsy.11
After less than eleven hours of deliberation the Texas jury found Merck responsible for the death of 59 year
old Robert Ernst. The jury awarded Carol Ernst $253.4 million in punitive and compensatory damages.12
Ernst v. Merck & Co. was the ﬁrst Vioxx case to go to trial and it was a huge victory for the plaintiﬀ.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Marc Kaufman, Merck Found Liable in Vioxx, Washington Post. August 20, 2005.
12Ibid.
3The crushing court decision in the Ernst case and the thousands of other cases like it which are now pending
has created tremendous interest in the Vioxx story. It is a long and complicated tale that often has sounds
of a soap opera drama. The purpose of this paper is to sort though the story of Vioxx in an eﬀort to better
understand the overwhelming surge of litigation which has followed. This paper will begin with the creation
of Vioxx by Merck. It will explain exactly what type of drug Vioxx actually is. It will discuss it intended
uses. And, importantly, it will elaborate on the ways in which the drug was tested.
Next this paper will explore the path a new drug takes to the FDA and FDA review and approval process.
It will consider how Vioxx was presented to the FDA and the manner in which the FDA examined it safety
and eﬃcacy. This paper will additionally elaborate on the criticism the FDA has received regarding its
treatment of Vioxx.
After considering the role of the FDA, this paper will tell the story of what happened once Vioxx was placed
on the market. It will discuss Merck’s advertising scheme. It will also discuss its ﬁnancial successes. And
most particularly, this paper will explore the decision by Merck to withdraw Vioxx from the market. It was
a decision that sent shockwaves through the drug industry as well as the government. And the withdrawal
has had a major eﬀect on the litigation which followed.
Finally, this paper will discuss the Vioxx litigation. It will consider some of the cases which have already
been decided. It will also look forward to those cases which are pending in an eﬀort to determine common
themes. And it will oﬀer predictions as to the way in which upcoming cases will play out and the eﬀect they
will have on Merck and the plaintiﬀs’ bar.
As mentioned, it is a long and complicated story. But it is also an interesting one. To best understand that
story, it is important to start at the beginning with the creation of the drug.
4COX-2 Inhibitors and Vioxx
Vioxx is a COX-2 inhibitor. COX-2 Inhibitors belongs to a class of drugs known as nonsteroidal anti-
inﬂammatory drugs (NSAIDS).13 NSAIDS are commonly prescribed for the inﬂammation of arthritis and
other body tissue. Traditional NSAIDS include Aspirin, ibuprofen or Motrin, naproxen, piroxicam, and
nabumetone or Relafen.14 NSAIDS relieve pain by inhibiting enzymes called COX-1 and COX-2.15 COX-2
inhibitors are drugs for inﬂammation which selectively block the COX-2 enzyme. Blocking this enzyme
challenges the creation of the chemical messengers, also known as prostoglandins that cause the pain and
swelling of arthritis inﬂammation.16 Researchers had previously discovered that when COX-1 was blocked,
there was interference with blood clotting and increased incidence of gastrointestinal events.17 Therefore, it
was exciting to discover that COX-2 inhibitors appeared to avoid the gastrointestinal pitfalls associated with
COX-1 inhibitors. Vioxx falls into the new class of COX-2 inhibitors with other drugs such as Celebrex.
Tests on Vioxx
A number of studies before but mainly after FDA approval of Vioxx were done to determine the safety and
eﬃcacy of the drug. It is important to have an understanding of these trials and the ﬁndings they produced
because many of them have proved integral to the unfolding Vioxx saga. The ﬁrst of these studies was
VIGOR.18
VIGOR
13Overview of COX-2 Inhibitor Drugs. www.medicinenet.com/script.main.art.asp?articlekey=952&pf=3&page=1.
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17Ibid.
18Vioxx Timeline: Key Dates for VIGOR and Long-term, Placebo-controlled Studies Implemented to Provide Cardiovascular
Safety Dates. Provided by Merck & Co.
5As noted previously, COX-1 inhibitors were commonly associated with a high rate of adverse gastrointestinal
(GI) events. The Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) trial was initiated to determine if
rofecoxib or Vioxx would have lower GI events than traditional COX-I NSAIDS.19 The study which was
published in 2000 (research was commenced in January of 1999) randomly assigned 8076 patients with
rheumatoid arthritis who were at least ﬁfty years old to either receive 50 mg of rofecoxib or 500 mg of
naproxen, a traditional COX-1 NSAID, twice daily. The study lasted 12 months.20
The results of the VIGOR study showed that Vioxx and naproxen were similarly eﬀective at treating rheuma-
toid arthritis. Patients taking rofecoxib, however, experienced about 50% less GI events than those taking
naproxen. Even though the gastrointestinal ﬁndings were the primary purpose of the study, they were quickly
overshadowed. Instead, it was those ﬁndings which concerned cardiovascular (CV) incidents that received
the most attention.21 The VIGOR study found that the incidence of myocardial infarction in rofecoxib
patients was much higher than in those patients assigned to take naproxen.22 Patients taking naproxen had
a heart attack rate of 0.1%. For patients taking Vioxx, the heart attack rate was 0.4%.23
The elevated risk of cardiovascular events began during the second month on rofecoxib during the trial. There
was no diﬀerence in the overall mortality rate or rate of cardiovascular deaths between the two groups.24
And the diﬀerence in overall myocardial infarction only existed between the rofecoxib and naproxen patients
who were already at higher risks for heart attacks.25 There were also no diﬀerences in the lower risk groups
according to the VIGOR results.
19Bombardier. Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid
Arthritis, 343 New England Journal of Medicine, 2000.
20Rofecoxib. www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rofecoxib.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
23Ibid.
24Bombardier. Ibid.
25Rofecoxib. Ibid.
6Scientists for Merck interpreted the elevated CV event rate for Vioxx users compared to users of naproxen
to mean that naproxen had a protective eﬀect against heat attacks.26 In other words Merck contended that
it was not that Vioxx created a higher rate of CV events; instead the rate looked higher next to naproxen
because naproxen actually prevented such events and therefore had a lower than normal rate. In November
of 2000 the VIGOR study was published in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) over a year after
FDA approval. In February of 2001 the results were presented to the FDA during a public hearing.27
New England Journal of Medicine Controversy
More public attention was drawn to the Vioxx story as a result of the publication of the VIGOR study
in the NEJM. A controversy erupted regarding an accusation made by the Journal’s editors claiming that
information presented by Merck to the FDA in 2001 had not been included in the November 2000 article.
The editors claimed that “more than four months before the article was published at least two of its authors
were aware of critical data on an array of adverse cardiovascular events that were not included in the VIGOR
article.”28 This additional unreported data was said to include three heart attacks which if included in the
trial would have raised the CV event risk of Vioxx to ﬁve times greater than naproxen.29 It was also contended
that the study published in the Journal did not report actual deaths even though it stated mortality rates
between the two groups to be the same. All the additional unreported heart attacks occurred in the low risk
of heart attack group known as the “aspirin not indicated group.”30 The results of these data omissions, the
26www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/01/brieﬁng/3677b2 06 cardio.pdf
27Rofecoxib. Ibid.
28www.content.nejm.org/cgi/content/extract/353/26/2813
29Ibid.
30Bombardier, C., Laine, L., Reicin, A., Shapiro, D., Burgos-Vargas, R., Davis, B., Day, R., Ferraz, M. B., Hawkey, C. J.,
Hochberg, M. C., Kvien, T. K., and Schnitzer, T. J., Comparison of upper gastrointestinal toxicity of rofecoxib and naproxen
in patients with rheumatoid arthritis. VIGOR Study Group, N Engl J Med, vol. 343, no. 21, pp. 1520-8, 2, Nov.2000.
7editors argued “resulted in the misleading conclusion that there was a diﬀerence in the risk of myocardial
infarctions between the aspirin indicated and aspirin not indicated groups.”31
The VIGOR study authors responded to contentions of the NEJM editors by claiming that the three addi-
tional heart attacks happened after the pre-determined study end date. They also stated that the omitted
information in no way fundamentally changed the ultimate conclusions of the study.
Alzheimer’s Study
Beginning in February of 1999 Merck conducted several studies of rofecoxib in order to determine if the drug
slowed the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. These trials were relatively large studies with close to 3000 patients
and they compared Vioxx to a placebo rather than to another drug, unlike the comparison to naproxen in
the VIGOR study.32 While these studies did show a higher death rate among users of rofecoxib patients,
the deaths were generally not cardiovascular.33 Also, the Alzheimer’s studies did not show an increase in
cardiovascular events among Vioxx users. For these reasons, Merck has readily pointed to these studies to
prove Vioxx safety and to refute other evidence to the contrary.
APPROVe Study
In 2001 Merck commenced the Adenomolous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) study. APPROVe was
a three year trial with the main goal of evaluating the “eﬃcacy of rofecoxib for prophylaxis of colorectal
31Ibid.
32Rofecoxib. Ibid.
33Ibid.
8polyps.”34 At the time the study commenced, it was known by researches that precancerous tissues also
produce COX enzymes. Therefore, scientists wanted to explore the possibility of inhibiting those enzymes
in an eﬀort to stop or slow cancer growth.35
Speciﬁcally, the APPROVe study was used to determine if 25 mg of Vioxx could prevent the reoccurrence
of colon polyps in patients with a history of colorectal adenomas which are benign tumors in the large
intestine.36 An additional aim of the study was to, again, evaluate the cardiovascular safety of rofecoxib.37
The APPROVe trial was a randomized trial of 2586 patients receiving either 25 mg of Vioxx per day or a
placebo within twelve weeks of surgical resection of colorectal polyps and after three years of treatment.38
The study ended early, however, and for that reason no report was produced regarding Vioxx’s ability to
reduce the risk of colon cancer.39
The study ended prematurely when initial data revealed an increased risk of adverse cardiovascular events.
The increased risk began after eighteen months of taking rofecoxib.40 In those patients taking Vioxx, there
were 1.50 cardiovascular events per 100 patient years. Alternatively, those patients taking the placebo
suﬀered only 0.78 cardiovascular events in the same period of time.41
The Cleveland Clinic Study
34Ibid.
35Prescription for Trouble. Ibid.
36Anonymous. Cardiovascular Risk of Selective COX-2 Inhibitors...Fact or Fiction? Johns Hopkins Arthritis Forum.
http://www.hopkins-arthritis.som.jhmi.edu/news-archive/2005/cardiac risk cox2.html#approve
37Rofecoxib. Ibid.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
9The Cleveland study was a retrospective study used to determine the accuracy of the previous test ﬁnding
which showed that COX-2 inhibitors did in fact increase the risks of cardiovascular events.42 The study
was headed by Doctors Mukherjee, Nissen and Topol of the Department of Cardiovascular Medicine of the
Cleveland Clinic. The results of the study appeared in the Journal of the American Medical Association.
The Cleveland Clinic Trial tested Celebrex, the Pﬁzer COX-2 NSAID, as well as Vioxx. The trial was unique
in that its method of analysis was to study four previous randomized, double-blind trials of COX-2 inhibitors
published between 1998 and February of 2001.43 The trials analyzed by the Cleveland Clinic included the
VIGOR study, Study 085, and Study 090. Study 085 and Study 090 were small clinical trials done in house
by Merck which occurred prior to the VIGOR trial and prior to FDA review and approval. The results of
those studies were not made public until they were later published in an FDA memorandum.44
The largest study analyzed in these trials was VIGOR. The VIGOR study had previously demonstrated
a dramatic increase in cardiovascular event rates in patients taking rofecoxib compared to those patients
taking naproxen.45 However, the “absolute incidence” documented in that study was 1.3% for the rofecoxib
group and 0.67% for the naproxen group. Studies 085 and 090 were smaller, placebo-controlled studies.46
Study 085 compared the eﬃcacy and safety of rofecoxib with the placebo after six weeks of treatment for
osteoarthritis in the knee. There were a total of three CV events during the study, all of which took place in
the rofecoxib test group. Study 090 was identical to Study 085 but was not limited to six weeks.47 In Study
42Mukherjee, D., Nissen, S. E., and Topol, E. J., Risk of cardiovascular events associated with selective COX-2 inhibitors,
JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 286, no. 8, pp. 954-959, Aug.2001.
43Ibid.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
10090, there were nine recorded CV events and six were from the rofecoxib group.
The Cleveland Clinic trial research compared these trial results with four large trials of aspirin and placebo
for prevention of heart attacks.48 The trials involved 48,450 patients. The ﬁndings of the Cleveland Clinic
were startling. The heart attack rate for the placebo group was 0.50% whereas the rate for the rofecoxib
group was 0.74%.
The Lancet Study
Dr. David Graham, associate director for science at the Food and Drug Administration’s Oﬃce of Drug
Safety, published a study in January of 2004 in the British medical journal The Lancet. The study examined
the risks of COX-2 drugs of which Dr. Graham had been a long standing critic. The ﬁndings of his study
only reinforced his long standing objection to the safety of the drug.
Dr. Graham and his team of researchers initiated the study for the purpose of determining whether the risk
of serious CV events was increased in those patients taking rofecoxib or Vioxx.49 To make this determination
the researchers used the California managed-care patient database as the group of test patients. The database
included 1.4 million patients. The study was observational and retrospective. It looked at all those patients
who ﬁlled at least one prescription for a COX-2 inhibitor (the study also looked at Celebrex) between January
48Ibid.
49Memorandum from Dr. David Graham, Director of Science, Oﬃce of Drug Safety to Dr. Paul Seligman, Director, Oﬃce
of Drug Safety. Re: Study entitled “Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death in Patients Treated with
COX-2 Selective and Non-Selective NSAIDS.” http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/vioxxgraham.pdf
111999 and December 31, 2001.50 The study then recorded the number of cardiovascular events experienced
by those patients.
Overall, the study found that those patients taking Vioxx had a 59% higher risk of CV events than those
patients taking other COX-2 inhibitors such as Celebrex.51 It also found that those individuals taking a
lower dose of rofecoxib had only a 42% increase. Whereas those taking higher doses had a 360% increase.52
Dr. Graham also noted that the ﬁve-fold increase of CV event risk found in the VIGOR study could not
be attributed to naproxen’s preventative eﬀect as previously argued by Merck scientists.53 Instead, Dr.
Graham’s study found that patients taking naproxen had a 14% increased rate of cardiovascular events.54
A great deal of controversy surrounded The Lancet study. Some researchers have contended that the study
possessed signiﬁcant ﬂaws. One obvious ﬂaw was that Dr. Graham identiﬁed only those patients who had
been prescribed COX-2 inhibitors. That group of patients is already at a higher risk of heart problems.
Therefore, data showing an increase in CV events among those selected patients could be misleading given
their existing proclivity for such incidents.
In addition to research related problems, the publication of this study placed Dr. Graham in the media
spotlight. The study was originally to be published on the eve of his testimony before congress regarding
the FDA’s handling of the Vioxx approval process (to be discussed later). While the paper was withdrawn
from publication at that time and not printed until some three months later, it was still considered an eﬀort
50Ibid.
51Ibid.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
12on the part of Dr. Graham to conﬁrm and reinforce the points he intended to make to Congress concerning
the risks associated with Vioxx. Dr. Graham argued that he had previously recognized the harm that Vioxx
presented but that the FDA had ignored his position. it is not at all surprising that the FDA did not want
The Lancet study published given that it concluded that between 88,000 and 140,000 incidents of serious
CV events are likely to have been caused by the drug. 55
Conclusions about the Vioxx Studies
An understanding of the research done on Vioxx is critical because much of the debate concerning Vioxx
has involved the ﬁndings of each of these studies and trials. It is clear that each study found that Vioxx
increased, to some degree, the risk of cardiovascular events in those patients taking the drug. Therefore, the
most important issues to be considered regarding these tests are: when were the test results available, how
were the results interpreted, and who was privy to the results. Critics of Merck such as Dr. Topol, of the
Cleveland study, claim that the company had the results of smaller studies such as Studies 090 and 085 prior
to FDA review, which showed an increase in CV events but refused to publish them.56 Therefore, it could
be argued that Merck should have not presented the drug for FDA approval until it conﬁrmed or refuted the
ﬁndings (later, of course, the ﬁndings were conﬁrmed in the VIGOR study). On the other hand, some point
the ﬁnger at the FDA. It is argued that while the majority of the previously mentioned test results were not
available at the time Vioxx was being considered for market approval, the FDA was too quick to approve
Vioxx. The FDA could have waited for more results to become available. And even after market approval,
as the test results did become available, the FDA was too slow to consider the appropriate response to the
ﬁndings. To best determine if these criticisms of the FDA are warranted, an understanding of the FDA’s
55Ibid.
56Prescription for Touble, CBS News, www.cbsnews.com. August 28, 2005
13approval process is necessary.
The Food and Drug Administration
Almost seventy years ago, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938. The FDCA
was passed in an eﬀort to reform the failing drug industry. Speciﬁcally, the FDCA was drafted in response
to the death of more than 100 people who perished from drinking Elixir Sulfanilamide, a form of sulfa
medicine that was manufactured and sold in the United States.57 Before the FDCA, the Food and Drugs
Act of 1906 required only that drugs meet a standard of “strength and purity.”58 Under the FDCA, however,
manufacturers had to prove the safety of any drug to be sold across state lines. Twenty-four years later, again
eﬀorts were made to improve the drug manufacturing process. In 1962, Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver
became concerned with negligence in the pharmaceutical industry after a drug manufactured in Germany
and sold throughout Europe was known to cause serious birth defects in the children of mothers who took
the drug.59 His attention to this problem resulted in the writing of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments also
known as the Drug Amendments Act of 1962. The Act required drug manufacturers to establish the “safety
and eﬀectiveness” of all drugs in the market.60 The Act also made the FDA responsible for regulating the
drug industry.
Today the FDA is a major player in the drug industry. The job of approving prescription drugs belongs to
57“United States Drug Approval Process.” www.imaginis.com/breasthealth/drug approval.asp?mode=1
58Ibid.
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
14the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). Prior to entering the marketplace CDER must
approve all new prescription drugs. The process of drug development and review is lengthy and complicated
and it begins with pre-clinical research.
Pre-Clinical Research
There are several ways in which a new drug is developed. Research generally begins broadly, often with
scientists considering the fundamentals of the human body and the way in which it functions. Ideas are then
developed regarding new ways to treat illnesses and abnormalities.61 Researches then begin to search for
compounds that will help achieve the desired, hypothesized results. The experimental drug, once created, is
tested to determine how well it works and what, if any, adverse eﬀects it could potentially produce.62 It is
during the pre-clinical stage that short term animal testing occurs.63
Researchers try to use as few animals as possible in these tests. A variety of species are often tested for
the purpose of determining how the drug is absorbed and chemically broken down once it enters the blood
stream of diﬀerent organisms.64 These tests also examine the toxicity of the drug and the length of time
it remains in the body. The results of the pre-clinical tests are then used for the purpose of submitting an
Investigational New Drug (IND) application to CDER.65 CDER reviews the application and its supporting
data to determine if the drug is safe enough to be tested on humans in the clinical studies stage.
Clinical Studies
The main purpose of stage two clinical studies is to determine the safety and eﬃcacy of the proposed drug
61Ibid.
62The Drug Approval Process: How Drugs Come to Market. Rx Times.
63Ibid.
64Ibid.
65Ibid.
15through the use of tests on humans.66 These human tests are most often done at universities, cancer centers,
hospitals, or private clinics.67 The clinical studies consist of several phases. Phase I tests the experimental
drug on healthy subjects who do not have the illness which the drug is proposed to help. This testing takes
an average of six months to one year and it is conducted for the purpose of establishing how a healthy body
responds to the drug, possible side eﬀects, and the appropriate dosage to be recommended.68
Phase II allows researchers to test the drug on patients who suﬀer the illness to be treated by the drug.69
The patient group here is larger than the one tested in Phase I and the testing generally lasts twice as long.70
If at least one-ﬁfth of the patients respond well to the drug then the drug is considered eﬀective. If eﬀective,
then studies on the drug can advance to Phase III.
In Phase III, the sponsors of the drug are expected to meet with oﬃcials at the FDA to set-up the parameters
of Phase III testing.71 This is the most important round of testing because the number of patient participants
can range from several hundred to several thousand.
The broad size of these studies allows for more accurate data regarding safety and eﬃcacy.
After the diﬀerent phases of stage two is stage three, which is the FDA review and approval process. In this
stage, the drug sponsors must bring together all the information and data collected during the testing and
must submit that information in a formal application to the FDA called a New Drug Application (NDA).
The NDA is often very thorough and can run more than 1,000 pages in length.72 The FDA then reviews
all the information presented in the application and considers the risks versus the beneﬁts of approving the
drug. If necessary the FDA can suggest further testing be conducted on the drug if it seems that there is
not enough data to make a decision on approval one way or the other.73 The proposed labeling of the drug
66“United States Drug Approval Process.” Ibid.
67Ibid.
68The Drug Approval Process. Ibid.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.
71Ibid.
72Ibid.
73Ibid.
16is also reviewed and subject to approval. While the review process can last as long as seven to thirteen
years, recently, the review time has been reduced signiﬁcantly.74 CDER, which serves as the primary review
board in the approval process, in general terms, asks and considers the answers to two basic questions when
considering the approval of a new drug: 1- “Do the results of clinical studies provide substantial evidence
of the drugs eﬀectiveness?” and 2- “Do the results of clinical studies show that the drug is safe under the
proposed labeling.”75
If a drug is approved, it is then marketed and sold to the general public. At that point there is often a Phase
IV follow-up study.76 Whether or not a Phase four study is initiated is entirely in the FDA’s discretion.
Now, more often than not, these studies always take place for new drugs. Phase four is used as a monitoring
device that helps to track side eﬀects and any other adverse complications associated with the drug once it
is prescribed to the general public.77 If the ﬁndings of a Phase four study are unsatisfactory, the FDA can
withdraw approval of the drug.
Accelerated v. Traditional FDA Approval
As discussed earlier, the Food and Drug Administration’s mission is to serve and protect the public interest by
regulating and ensuring the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs and medical devices.78 The scope of the FDA’s power
74Ibid.
75Ibid.
76Melissa Marie Bean. Fatal Flaws in the Food and Drug Administration’s Drug Approval Formula. Utah Law Review. 2003
Utah L. Rev. 881
77Ibid.
78FDA Mission Statement. http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html
17is far reaching. It controls the clinical research, approval, and advertising language of new pharmaceuticals.79
In performing its function as overseer, the FDA has been historically very cautious and thorough.
In the 1980s, however, the AIDS crisis called for a new approach to drug approval.80 The epidemic generated
a strong lobbying group which demanded that Congress allow for the FDA to speed up the review process for
drugs which could prove to be life-saving.81 The lobbying eﬀort was successful. Congress drafted section (h)
of C.F.R. 314.500 which provided for “fast track” approval of drugs used to treat “serious or life-threatening
illness and that provide meaningful therapeutic beneﬁt to patients over existing treatments.”82 The eﬀects
of the new approval process were immediate. In 1987, approval time for a new drug was over two years.
In 1992 the approval time was nineteen months.83 The success of the AIDS lobbyists was the catalysts for
cancer activists to seek similar treatment for their own drugs. In response to the increased rallying cry for
continued acceleration of the drug approval process, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).
The FDAMA was similar to C.F.R. 314.500. It established three levels of the drug approval process. The
ﬁrst is a “fast-track” designation for drugs used to treat life-threatening illnesses or an illness for which
there are currently no treatments available.84 A drug given fast-track designation receives approval in six
months or less. The second level created by FDAMA is “priority review” which provides approval in twelve
months or less for those drugs that also treat life-threatening illnesses. And ﬁnally, the third level which is
the “accelerated level” provides for traditional approval times (but still considerably faster than traditional
79Melissa Marie Bean. Ibid.
80Ibid.
81Ibid.
8221 C.F.R. 314.500
83Melissa Marie Bean. Ibid.
8421 USC 356, Sect. 506.
18approval times of the decade previous).85 The FDAMA also established a system where pharmaceutical
companies pay the FDA a fee to ensure that there are enough employees to make this expedited approval
process happen.
The changes called for by activists ﬁghting life threatening diseases and those implemented by the Congress
were all in an eﬀort to ensure that medical advancements in drug treatments were not kept from those
patients most in need because of bureaucratic delay. It seems that at the time when AIDS was killing
countless people, there was an idea that the FDA had the cure for the disease but was simply not releasing it
to the public. The acceleration of the approval process was an eﬀort to shatter that image. In the years since
the changes took eﬀect, however, new concerns have surfaced. Many critics argue that the FDA’s eﬀorts to
speed up and improve the approval process have gone too far and at the price of safety.
One major complaint with the new FDA system is that it puts the FDA in the pocket of the pharmaceutical
companies. Because the manufacturers pay the FDA fees it is argued that they will feel entitled to an
expedited review. And the FDA may in fact feel obligated to approve drugs too quickly or to approve
drugs that should not be approved at all.86 While a healthy working relationship between the FDA and
the pharmaceutical industry is undoubtedly important, some critics argue that they should not become too
close. The mission of the FDA is to guarantee that only safe and eﬀective drugs enter the market. The
argument follows that an FDA under the inﬂuence of pharmaceutical companies might fail in that mission.
In addition to concerns over FDA manipulation critics of the new approval system also claim that expedited
review is often granted to drugs not used to treat life-threatening illnesses.87 Including more drugs for
priority review will also undermine the FDA mission of consumer protection.
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87As will be discussed later, a good example of this fact is Vioxx. It received priority review but it was submitted for approval
only to treat acute pain and arthritis- not a life-threatening illness.
19Critics of the new accelerated drug approval timeline also argue that the expedited process has caused the
FDA to approve unsafe drugs. In order to act within the required window of time, the FDA might approve
a drug too hastily. Some FDA research oﬃcials have complained that they have felt pressure to approve
drugs that they felt did not warrant approval.88 Since the expedited drug approval system was enacted, the
FDA has approved 80% of drugs submitted for review as opposed to only 60% in the early 1990s.89 It is
also contended that the FDA has become more willing to go forward with approval even when the requisite
scientiﬁc data is unavailable.
Supporters of the accelerated drug approval process, on the other hand, have strong arguments on their side.
First, it is argued that without an accelerated system for the most necessary drugs, many terminal patients
would be without possible life-saving medicines. As mentioned earlier it was AIDS advocates who initiated
the outcry for a speedier drug approval process. It was argued that the regulatory constraints on the drug
approval process were costing peoples’ lives by holding up a drug’s placement on the market.
Also, there is a free market argument in support of fast track FDA drug approval. That argument contends
that there are strong incentives on the pharmaceutical companies to only present to the FDA those drugs
which actually merit approval. If a pharmaceutical company submits a drug to the FDA for priority review
and that drug, after it is approved, it is found to be unsafe or dangerous to the public, the pharmaceutical
company will suﬀer.90 Therefore, no company would want to submit an unsafe drug for approval. The Vioxx
story illustrates each of the arguments both for and against accelerated drug approval.
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20FDA Review and Approval of Vioxx
The FDA approved Vioxx in May of 1999. It was approved for the primary purpose of reducing the signs and
symptoms of osteoarthritis as well as for treating acute pain in adults.91 Vioxx received a “priority review”
because “the drug potentially provided signiﬁcant therapeutic advantage over existing approved drugs due
to its fewer gastrointestinal side eﬀects.92
Prior to its approval, Vioxx was presented to and reviewed by the FDA Arthritis Advisory Committee on
April 20, 1999. At the Committee hearing, Merck researchers presented their case for Vioxx and the FDA
researchers followed with their comments. In the original review of the drug, there was a safety database of
around 5000 patients.93 In the clinical trials the risk of gastrointestinal events was signiﬁcantly lower in the
patients taking Vioxx. And importantly, the trial data available to the FDA at the time the Vioxx review
in 1999 did not show an increase in cardiovascular events.
The Arthritis Committee unanimously approved Vioxx. However, the committee did have some concerns.
The major concern voiced was that patients would take more of the drug than was approved for dosage.
This practice is called “dose creep.” Clearly it is impossible to monitor the patient intake of any drug but
the concern over dose creeping was particularly high with Vioxx.94 The elevated concern was due to the fact
that some data showed dose-related toxicity. 12.5 mg was the suggested dose amount but it was thought
that some patients could go as high as 25 mg per day. Doses higher than 50 mg per day, however, could
91Statement of Sandra Kweder, MD. November 18, 2004. http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/vioxx1118.html
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93FDA CDER, Transcript of Arthritis Advisory Committee, Review of NDA #21-042, Apr. 20, 1999 at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/99/transcpt/3508t1.rtf.
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21cause problems for many patients. The Arthritis Committee therefore considered the option of allowing the
drug’s label to reﬂect the information that risk to the patient increased with dosage amount.95
An additional concern considered by the committee was also one regarding dosage amount. The committee
considered the issue of using Vioxx for the treatment of acute pain.96 It was decided that because the adverse
eﬀects found in the clinical studies did not kick in until after ﬁve days of use, 50 mg per day for ﬁve days
could be used to treat acute pain. After ﬁve days, use of Vioxx would need to be stopped.97 The majority
of the committee also agreed that Vioxx labeling should note that patients taking 50 mg per day for acute
pain could experience adverse side eﬀects.98
As mentioned earlier, the committee unanimously recommended that Vioxx be approved. The drug was
approved for the relief of signs and symptoms of osteoarthritis, acute pain, and the treatment of menstrual
cramps.
Post Approval Actions by FDA and Merck
Once it was approved for the market, Merck began an aggressive advertising campaign. The company spent
over $500 million on direct-to-consumer and direct-to-physician advertisements and promotions.99 This
money equaled more than $5 for each prescription written since the drug entered the market in 1999. In
2001, more money was spent on advertisements for Vioxx than for any other drug. Merck promoted Vioxx
as a much more eﬀective NSAID than those already on the market; a claim that later was proved false. And
while at ﬁrst the FDA required a gastrointestinal warning label on the drug, that warning was removed in
2002 when the results of the VIGOR study were released.
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22After approval of Vioxx, Phase four monitoring of the drug commenced. On March 30, 2000 the FDA
received its ﬁrst batch of troubling data. At that time, preliminary information regarding an increase of
cardiovascular events among Vioxx users compared with other patients was submitted.100 Then, later that
year in June, the ﬁndings of the VIGOR study were presented by Merck to the FDA. The study, as discussed
earlier, found a decrease in gastrointestinal side eﬀects but an increase in cardiovascular problems among
rofecoxib users. It was not until February 8, 2001 that the Arthritis Advisory Committee met to discuss
the VIGOR study results.101 The committee noted the appearance of increased CV events but agreed with
Merck’s explanation that naproxen had a preventative eﬀect and thought only that the ﬁndings needed
further study.102 The beneﬁt of lower gastrointestinal events was evidently viewed by the committee as a
beneﬁt that should be weighted heavily against any risks.103
After the ﬁndings of the Arthritis Committee, the FDA requested additional information from Merck in-
cluding further study ﬁndings. On July 12, 2001 Merck met this demand and submitted additional data
on the cardiovascular risk posed by Vioxx. In response to the ﬁndings, the FDA initiated the previously
discussed study conducted by Dr. Graham.104 The FDA also began negotiating with Merck for a Vioxx
label change.105 On November 6, 2001 Merck rejected the FDA’s proposed labeling and Merck countered
with a diﬀerent label change. The FDA decided that a face to face meeting with Merck was the only way
to approach the problem of the label change. Several meetings ensued between the parties and a ﬁnal label
100http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4090B1 04 E-FDA-TAB-C.htm. FDA Vioxx Timeline.
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23was not introduced until March 20, 2002, almost two years after the FDA ﬁrst received initial data showing
an increase in cardiovascular rates.106
On February 28, 2003 the FDA and Merck met to discuss the ﬁndings of the Alzheimer study as well as early
polyp study ﬁndings.107 Concerns over the heightened cardiovascular event rate were considered by both
sides. In December of the same year, despite these concerns, Merck submitted an application to the FDA to
consider Vioxx for the treatment of Juvenile Rheumatoid Arthritis (JRA).108 On September 27, 2004 Merck
was scheduled to brief the FDA on the current status of the Alzheimer study as well as studies supporting
the petition to approve Vioxx for treatment of JRA. That brieﬁng never took place. That same day Merck
received the news that the data from the APPROVe study showed an increased risk of myocardial infarction
and stroke.109 On September 30, 2004 Merck publicly announced the worldwide withdrawal of Vioxx.
Criticism of the FDA
At the time of the original Vioxx approval hearings, the information presented to the FDA and the arthritis
committee was limited. The vast majority of the major studies done on the safety and eﬃcacy of Vioxx
came after the 1999 approval. In spite of the now apparent lack of information and data on safety, the FDA
proceeded in an accelerated manner to approve Merck’s Vioxx. The handling of the approval process on the
part of the FDA has generated a great deal of criticism. This criticism in many ways reﬂects the general
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24debate over accelerated approval. Vioxx received priority review even though it was not intended for the
treatment of any life-threatening illness. Additionally many claim that the FDA approved Vioxx without
requisite scientiﬁc data. There were a number of studies that were ongoing but incomplete at the time Merck
presented the drug for FDA review. Instead of waiting for the ﬁndings of those studies, the FDA approved
the drug on the basis of the minimal data available.
In the aftermath of the Vioxx story, there was ﬁnger pointing to both the FDA and Merck as the negligent
party. Determining where fault lies is complicated and has no precise answer.
Were the actions of the FDA appropriate?
From the perspective of hindsight, it is easy to say that the FDA should not have approved Vioxx. However,
it is important to consider the position the FDA was in at the time of the approval process. The FDA
believed that while Vioxx was not going to treat life-threatening illnesses, it was considered unique in its
ability to treat arthritis and acute pain without the gastrointestinal side eﬀects. As Dr. Sandra Kweder,
acting director of the Oﬃce of New Drugs noted in her congressional testimony, “the general standard for
a priority review is applied when something is considered to have the potential to provide a clinical or
therapeutic advantage, and, in the case of Celebrex and Vioxx, it was hoped and expected that these drugs
would provide an important G.I. safety advantage.”110 The FDA did however, make mistakes. It is clear
that the FDA approved the drug prior to the conclusion of the most signiﬁcant safety studies. Even after
the FDA in 2000 was presented with the VIGOR study which showed an increase in heart attacks among
Vioxx users, it was not until many months later that Merck was advised to begin long term trials to further
110Statement of Sandra Kweder, MD. November 18, 2004. http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/vioxx1118.html.
25test for the cardiovascular eﬀect of Vioxx on patients.111 Additionally, although it was believed to be unique
in its ability to treat acute arthritic pain, there were other drugs on the market used for that purpose. If
Vioxx had not been given a priority review, the FDA would have had the time to wait for the initial results
of the major studies and the evidence of adverse cardiovascular occurrences associated with the drug might
likely have been discovered before it went on the market. And while the FDA and the Arthritis Committee
were thorough in their questioning and review of Merck regarding the limited data and study ﬁndings they
produced, the FDA should have demanded much more information before the drug was approved. The FDA
gave so much weight to Vioxx’s gastrointestinal beneﬁts that it all but ignored the cardiovascular risks of
the drug.
Were Merck’s actions appropriate?
The most important question to answer when considering if the actions of Merck were appropriate is what
information Merck had regarding increased cardiovascular events when it presented the drug for FDA ap-
proval. After the withdrawal of Vioxx from the market (to be discussed in detail later) it was discovered
through various investigations that Merck had some evidence of increased cardiovascular risks prior to the
1999 FDA review and approval, including speciﬁcally Study 085 and Study 090. It was also shown that at
the time Merck presented the drug for review, the larger and more long-term studies were not completed.
Only a very small number of patients taking the drug for over a full year had been observed.112 And yet,
Merck still proceeded to petition the FDA for market approval. It was irresponsible and very dangerous to
seek market approval for a drug that had some warning signs of cardiovascular risks. Merck should have
waited until the conclusion of its larger studies such as the VIGOR trial before it decided how to proceed
111The delay by the FDA in pressuring Merck to re-label the product was considerd in detail during the congressional hearings
and investigation and will be discussed later in this paper.
112This is an important point because the strongest scientiﬁc evidence shows most cardiovascular health risks are associated
with Vioxx use of over eighteen months.
26with Vioxx.
Merck Withdrawal
The Vioxx story was complicated and tenuous from the beginning but then in September of 2004 it became
even more unusual when Merck voluntarily recalled the drug oﬀ the market. In the years after the 1999
approval of Vioxx, Merck was very conﬁdent in the strength of the drug. It was so conﬁdent that it wanted
to expand the use of the drug to include the treatment of colon polyps. The APPROVe study, described
in detail earlier, was undertaken to determine if Vioxx was eﬀective in treating and/or preventing colon
cancer.113 The APPROVe study was hoped to initiate an expansion of the drug’s uses but instead the
results of that test initiated the beginning of the end for Vioxx.
The APPROVe study was stopped around the eighteen month mark when results showed an increase in
cardiovascular events. The CV events were double that found in patients taking the placebo.114 When
similar ﬁndings came out of the VIGOR test, Merck was able to attribute the increase in CV events to the
fact that naproxen had a protective eﬀect against heart attacks. Because the patients in the APPROVe
study took a placebo, no such claim could be made.115 Presumably unaware of another course of action,
Merck withdrew Vioxx.
The staggering eﬀects of the withdraw were only heightened when, on the same day of the announced
withdraw, Dr. David Graham Associate Director of Science in the FDA’s Oﬃce of Drug Safety, published
113Rofecoxib. Ibid.
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27his memorandum which detailed the results of a study he conducted on Vioxx (those results were published
in the British journal Lancet as discussed previously).116 In that memorandum, Dr. Graham concluded that
over 27,000 more patients taking Vioxx may have had heart attacks and/or died as compared with those
taking the milder drug Celebrex.117 While working with the FDA, Graham was in charge of investigating
the cardiovascular impact of NSAID drugs.118 He claimed that the FDA stiﬂed his eﬀorts to publish the
results of his studies.119
The September 30, 2004 withdrawal of Vioxx brought diﬃcult times for both Merck and the FDA. Much
discussion and debate has centered on the decision by Merck to voluntarily withdrawal the drug. Some
arguments have been made that the withdrawal was beneﬁcial to Merck’s cause. It can also be argued,
however, that in fact the voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx was anything but positive for the drug manufacturer.
Merck’s decision to withdrawal Vioxx from the market was done voluntarily and came before any such demand
was made by the FDA. First it is important to note that by voluntarily pulling a drug, the possibility of
the drug reentering the market at a later date is kept open.120 It is possible that Merck wanted to have the
option of reintroducing the drug at a later time after pursuing more vigorous studies into its safety. A more
likely rationale for the voluntary recall was a litigation strategy. After the recall of any drug litigation is
undoubtedly going to follow and it is generally believed that a drug manufacturer that independently chooses
to remove its product from the market will receive a better reception from juries in future litigation.121 The
reason for this is simple; it shows that the manufacturer is acting responsibly and with the interest of public
safety as the priority. Therefore, if Merck ﬁnds sympathy from juries its decision will provide it some beneﬁt.
However, whether that beneﬁt will out weigh the cost of the recall is doubtful because the costs appear to
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28be great.
The recall of Vioxx by Merck has been treated by public opinion not so much as the act of a responsible
drug manufacturer but instead as an admission of negligent conduct.122 As mentioned, the withdrawal was
accompanied by an onslaught of editorials and memoranda on the part of researchers and scientists, such
as Dr. Graham of the FDA, stating the dangers associated with the drug. The ﬁnancial repercussions were
immediately felt as well. The day it announced the recall, Merck shares were at $45.07. By the end of the
day they fell $12 to $33 per share.123 It was not long before there was talk of a possible merger.124
In addition to the decline in Merck’s market standing, the recall of Vioxx also led to more long term problems.
The withdrawal was closely followed by investigations by both the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). There was also a strenuous Congressional investigation and
hearings. And there was an immediate ﬂood of litigation. This paper will consider each of these eﬀects in
turn, beginning with the investigation by the SEC.
SEC Investigation
Because Merck is a publicly held company with shares held by both individual shareholders as well as
institutional investors, the SEC is responsible for protecting those interests.125 A publicly held company can
be held liable if it at any time it misled investors about important information regarding the company or
its product. Following the withdrawal of Vioxx, Merck share prices dropped substantially. And since that
time, Merck’s market value declined by billions of dollars, dramatically eﬀecting investors and shareholders.
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29In November 2004, the SEC began an “informal” investigation into the pharmaceutical manufacturer and
by January 28, 2005 Merck announced that the investigation had been elevated to a formal one.126 The
decision was a serious blow for Merck.127
In a formal investigation, the SEC has the authority to subpoena witnesses to testify to the handling of
the Vioxx situation by Merck. While the SEC has a policy of not divulging any information regarding
their formal investigations, the subject of their inquiry is fairly obvious. The SEC is likely interested in
determining when Merck became aware of the cardiovascular risks associated with Vioxx. This information
is important because Merck would have been obligated to inform the investors and shareholders of such a
serious problem that would have undoubtedly aﬀected the value and strength of the company and its stocks.
The ﬁndings and results of that investigation which began over a year ago have not yet been disclosed.
Department of Justice Investigation
In addition to the SEC investigation of Merck’s dealings with shareholders and investors, in January 2005
the Department of Justice began a criminal investigation into the pharmaceutical company’s dealings.128
At the heart of the DOJ investigation is again the extent of Merck’s knowledge of Vioxx’s adverse health
risks. After the September 2004 recall, much evidence was presented to the media that seemed to show that
Merck was aware of the health risks associated with Vioxx. An indictment of Merck could occur if it is found
that the company knew of the cardiovascular risks and yet obscured the dangers in an eﬀort to market and
sell the drug. Speciﬁcally, the Department of Justice will investigate whether “Merck mislead regulators or
126Big Health Plan Suspends Use of Painkiller. Gardiner Harris. New York Times. January 29, 2005.
127It is also worth noting that at this same time, Merck lost its patent protection for its very popular drug Fosamax, used
for bone-replacement. The decision took away the patent ten years earlier than expected. It was thought that Fosamax could
soften the eﬀect of the loss of Vioxx. The loss of the Fosamax patent only added to Merck’s problems at this time.
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30perhaps caused federal health programs to pay for the prescription drug when its use was not warranted.”129
Like the SEC investigation, the Department of Justice probe into Merck’s handling of Vioxx is still pending.
Congressional Investigation
Merck’s voluntary recall of Vioxx captured the attention of not just the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Department of Justice but also the United State Congress. Both the Senate Finance Committee
and the House Committee on Government Reform held hearings to examine the actions of Merck and the
FDA regarding Vioxx. This paper will begin with an examination of the ﬁndings of the Senate hearing.
On November 18, 2004 the Senate Finance Committee chaired by Republican Senator Charles Grassley
of Iowa, heard testimony from witnesses in an eﬀort to sort through the ill fated story of Vioxx. In his
opening statements to the Committee, Sen. Grassley stated that the purpose of the hearing was to ensure
that Congress was performing its function as overseer of both the federal bureaucracy and the private
sector.130 He noted that the Committee would consider the decisions and action of both the FDA and
Merck Pharmaceuticals in its inquiry and investigation.131 And while Sen. Grassley stated that both the
FDA and Merck have a history of good standing in regards to their business practices, the Iowa Senator had
harsh comments for both organizations in his opening remarks. He stated, “We’ll see that the FDA failed
to heed the words of even its own scientists [spelling changed]. It also looks like the FDA allowed itself to
be manipulated by Merck on labeling changes that became necessary after a review by Merck that’s known
as the VIGOR trial...Now, over a period of 22 months, Merck aggressively marketed Vioxx knowing that
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31consumers and doctors were largely unaware of the cardiovascular risks in the VIGOR trial.”132 Senator
Grassley clearly believed that both parties should receive some blame.
On the day of the hearing, the Committee heard testimony from three panels of witnesses. The ﬁrst panel
included Dr. David Graham, Dr. Gurkirpal Singh, and Dr. Bruce Psaty. Dr. David Graham testiﬁed
ﬁrst. Dr. Graham’s testimony was a scathing attack of the Food and Drug Administration, his employer
for over twenty years. He testiﬁed that the FDA completely failed in its duty to serve as overseer of the
prescription drugs which enter the market. He called the actions of the FDA in regards to Vioxx a “profound
regulatory failure.”133 He stated that prior to the submission of Vioxx to the FDA, Study 090 performed
by Merck, showed a seven-fold increase in the number of heart attacks in patients receiving Vioxx. At
the time of approval, however, the FDA did not include that fact on Vioxx labeling.134 He then noted
that it was not until eighteen months after the VIGOR study results were published that the FDA made a
labeling change to Vioxx.135 Dr. Graham went on to say that because of the way that the FDA is currently
organized, citizens of the United States would be “virtually defenseless” if another medication is proved to
be dangerous after it receives FDA approval.136 He noted that the Oﬃce of New Drugs, which is higher in
the FDA hierarchy than Graham’s oﬃce of Drug Safety, is very reluctant to issue new regulations for drugs
already on the market. This is because the same organization that is responsible for approving the drug
is also responsible for making the decision to pull the drug from the market. As Dr. Graham stated, that
is “an inherent conﬂict of interest.”137 In Dr. Graham’s estimate, somewhere between 88,000 and 133,000
Americans suﬀered heart attacks or strokes as a result of using Vioxx and somewhere between 30% and 40%
died from those incidences.138 To make this ﬁgure crystal clear in the minds of the Senate Committee, Dr.
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32Graham illustrated his point by stating that the number of Americans adversely aﬀected by Vioxx is the
equivalent of between 500 and 900 passenger aircrafts falling from the sky.139
Dr. Graham testiﬁed that after he concluded his study in the summer of 2004, the study which was published
in the Lancet, he was “pressured to change [my] conclusions and recommendations.”140 He presented an
email from the director of the OND which supported that testimony. The comments of Dr. Graham were
dramatic and forceful and they sent shockwaves across the government and the drug industry.
Following the comments of Dr. David Graham, Dr. Bruce Pstay testiﬁed. Dr. Psaty, a cardiovascular
disease epidemiologist at the University of Washington in Seattle, focused his testimony on the development
and extent of Merck’s knowledge regarding the cardiovascular risks of Vioxx.141 Dr. Psaty also delivered
harsh criticism of the FDA’s handling of the Vioxx approval and post-market observation. He noted that
at the time Vioxx was presented to the FDA for review and approval, only 371 patients had received 25mg
doses of Vioxx for one year or more.142 He stated that in his opinion, that was far too few patients to
adequately evaluate the eﬀects of the drug. Like Dr. Graham, he also pointed out that there was over a one
year delay between the time when the FDA received and reviewed the result of the VIGOR trial and when
they made a label change. Dr. Psaty cited various statistics and ﬁndings from the previously mentioned
studies such as VIGOR and APPROVe. He stated that, in his medical judgment, there is a strong argument
that the gastrointestinal beneﬁts which would arguably be received by taking Vioxx over other traditional
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33NSAIDS would not out weigh the costly cardiovascular risks now associated with the drug.143 He noted
that while gastrointestinal problems can be serious they are rarely life threatening, whereas 25% of heart
attacks are deadly.144 He concluded his remarks with suggested reforms that might ensure another incident
like this never occurs. Among these reforms were the requirement of large and long-term studies of every
drug and the creation of an independent center for drug safety to evaluate drugs after they enter the market;
a suggestion which echoed Dr. Graham’s conclusion that the FDA, as it is currently arranged cannot both
approve and monitor drugs.145
Following the comments of Dr. Psaty, the Senate Committee heard the testimony of Dr. Singh. Dr. Singh
made very similar comments to those made by the two doctors preceding him. However, he focused his
attention more on the actions of Merck. He testiﬁed that he has devoted much of his career to lecturing
physicians on the latest drugs to enter the market place.146 To that end, he often contacts drug manufacturers
to secure information regarding safety data. While Merck had always responded to his requests “promptly
and in a scientiﬁc fashion,” when he questioned the company about the VIGOR results he did not receive
that same treatment. Dr. Singh testiﬁed that after he persisted in his inquiries regarding VIGOR, he
was warned by Merck that if he continued to bother the company for information there would be “serious
consequences.”147
Dr. Singh commented that Merck clearly believed that the gastrointestinal beneﬁts of Vioxx were important
enough and valuable enough to the drug market to continue regardless of any associated cardiovascular
consequences. He went on to say, however, that, “the trade-oﬀ of heart attacks for the rare instances of
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34stomach bleeds is not a reasonable one.”148 He stated, like Dr. Psaty that there were no large studies to
either prove or disprove the link between Vioxx and cardiovascular events. And he opined that the decision
to not carry out those large studies was for marketing and public relations reasons.149 He concluded his
comments with ways to reform the drug review and approval system, again to include the creation of an
independent drug safety oﬃce.
After the testimony of panel one, Dr. Sandra Kweder oﬀered a defense of the FDA as acting director of the
Oﬃce of New Drugs. In her defense of the FDA, Dr. Kweder contended that the FDA’s Arthritis Committee
extensively reviewed the information presented to it regarding Vioxx. According to her testimony, the FDA
was aware of some limited data that suggested the potential for cardiovascular risk. However, it was the
gastrointestinal beneﬁts that made the drug appealing to the FDA at the time of approval.150
After approval, when the FDA received the results of the VIGOR trial, Dr. Kweder asserted that the
FDA “worked actively and vigorously with Merck to inform public health professionals of what was known
regarding [cardiovascular] risk with Vioxx, and to pursue further deﬁnitive investigations to better deﬁne
and quantify this risk.”151 She also stated her objection to the testimony of Dr. Graham by claiming that
Dr. Graham’s estimates of Vioxx’s toll were mere mathematical guesses and “not real deaths.”152 She went
on to say that the FDA about which Dr. Graham spoke is not the FDA that she knows.153 She stated
that it was the FDA’s vigilant demand that Merck hold long term trials after the initial approval that led to
the studies which directly resulted in Merck’s withdrawal of Vioxx. And while she did not fully endorse the
widely recommended independent Oﬃce of Drug Safety, she did say it was an idea “worth looking at.”154
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35Finally, the November 18, 2004 Senate Hearing concluded with a defense of Merck Pharmaceuticals in
testimony from Merck’s CEO and President Raymond Gilmartin. Mr. Gilmartin began his remarks with
comments regarding the unique quality of Vioxx. He noted that Vioxx was the only NSAID that could provide
acute pain relief without the gastrointestinal side eﬀects that accompanied similar drugs. Mr. Gilmartin
made the claim that at the time Merck presented the drug to the FDA for approval Merck researchers had
“extensively studied the medicine and found it to be safe and eﬀective.”155 He speciﬁcally denied that
evidence prior to the approval showed any elevation in the risk of cardiovascular events. He commented on
the VIGOR study and defended Merck’s analysis of the study which led to the conclusion that the diﬀerence
in cardiovascular event rates was due to the preventative eﬀect of naproxen. He concluded his remarks by
proclaiming his conﬁdence that after a thorough investigation of Merck’s conduct it will be found that the
company acted in a manner consistent with its main goal of patient safety.156
The United States House of Representatives conducted its own investigation on the Vioxx matter. The
May 5, 2005 hearing before the Committee on Government Reform covered much of the same topics as
the Senate hearing the year prior. However, the House committee hearing focused on the issue of Merck’s
aggressive advertising maneuvers. The committee examined over 20,000 pages of internal Merck documents
which oﬀered tremendous insight into the techniques used by Merck’s sales representatives in selling Vioxx
to physicians.
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36The internal documents showed that Merck’s sales staﬀ was taught how to sell Vioxx to physicians without
mentioning the cardiovascular risks associated with the drug.157 If physicians inquired about the cardiovas-
cular risks, sales representatives were instructed to refer to a “Cardiovascular Card” when making presen-
tations.158 The card was created in April of 2000, one month after the VIGOR study was completed. It
contained information from studies which had previously been submitted to the FDA but did not include
any data or statistics from the VIGOR study which showed an increase risk of heart attack in patients taking
Vioxx. And although the FDA Arthritis Committee voted in 2001 to require Merck to notify physicians
of the VIGOR study ﬁndings, a subsequent Merck memorandum sent to all sales associates clearly ignored
the orders of the FDA. The memo instructed sales representatives to respond to any questions about the
VIGOR study by saying, “I cannot discuss the study with you.”159
The sales team was given extensive and sometimes bizarre training and instruction regarding the manner
in which they sold or “detailed” Vioxx to physicians. They were trained how to smile, speak, and position
themselves in the most eﬀective manner when talking with doctors.160 They were also told to the use Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream Speech” to help sell Vioxx. Representative Elijah Cummings of
Maryland read from the Merck training manual during the hearings. The manual stated, “[Dr.] King was
someone with goal-focus – he kept getting shut down but kept going.... Just as with a physician, you must
keep repeating the compelling message and at some point, the physician will be ’free at last’ when he or she
prescribes the Merck drug, if that is most appropriate for the patient.161 The sales force was taught how
to capitalize on every interaction with a physician in order to sell Merck pharmaceuticals including Vioxx.
Representative Henry Waxman of California stated in the committee report that it was clear from the Merck
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37documents that the goal of the company was sales and not education.162
Steven Galson, director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research testiﬁed that the FDA was
unaware of the details of Merck’s advertising campaign.163 However, he stated that Merck’s legal obligations
require them only to provide the information that was approved in drug labeling. He went on to say that
the promotional materials used by the Merck sales team were “accurate based on the [Vioxx] label.”164 Mr.
Galson did state that Merck needed to convey only truthful information to physicians when selling Vioxx
and based on the internal documents and memos it appeared to him that Merck had not given doctors “the
entire picture.”165
Dennis Erb, Merck’s Vice President testiﬁed on behalf of Merck. He testiﬁed that Merck acted appropriately
throughout the Vioxx situation. He stated that the sale’s staﬀ was trained to be “accurate and balanced”
in presenting drug information to physicians.166 Erb’s defense of Merck’s decision not to tell doctors about
the cardiovascular risks associated with Vioxx was based on the fact that Merck believed that naproxen, the
control drug in earlier studies, decreased the risk of heart attack as opposed to Vioxx increasing the risk. He
went on to note that Merck was considering approaching the FDA about reapplying for market approval of
the drug.
Committee chairman, Representative Tom Davis of Virginia, was slow to criticize Merck, unlike his Senate
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38counterpart Charles Grassley. Davis stated that while the internal documents raised some questions he was
not prepared to criticize the company without further information and evidence. He commented that a
“wide-awake physician” would have known about the heart risks associated with Vioxx by reading the now
famous editorials about the drug in various medical journals and newspapers. Another witness to appear
before the committee, however, Dr. Michael Wilkes, refuted that statement by Chairman Davis. Dr. Wilkes,
vice dean for medical education at the University of California-Davis, commented that doctors are often too
busy with patients to read such medical literature. Instead, they rely on the information provided to them
by the pharmaceutical salesmen.167
As a side note to the hearings, on the same day as the House committee’s hearing, Merck CEO Raymond
Gilmartin abruptly resigned his position. Gilmartin held the position of CEO for over eleven years and
was only ten months away from retirement. The Washington Post reported that until the Vioxx debacle,
Gilmartin was held in high regard in the pharmaceutical industry.168 Since the September 2004 with-
drawal and the subsequent investigations and hearings, the reputation of Merck and Gilmartin plummeted.
Gilmartin was replaced by Richard Clark, the long time president of Merck’s manufacturing division.
The hearings held in both the Senate and the House of Representatives are a vital part of the Vioxx story. The
story of the failed drug is a complicated one and the hearings helped to map out the elements of each stage of
the drug’s life. Through witness testimony and congressional comments, the details of Merck’s pre-approval
research were ﬂeshed out, the process of the FDA’s review and approval were discussed, the post-approval
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39of the drug was better understood, the intricacies of Merck’s marketing strategy were discovered, and the
situation surrounding the voluntary withdrawal of the drug were explained. Additionally, the fact that the
Congress took the time to review and examine the exact happenings of the Vioxx debacle clearly indicated
that there was a problem and some party should shoulder the responsibility for causing that problem. The
congressional duty of oversight is one that is not taken lightly. Congress’ interest in Vioxx sent a strong
message that irresponsible actions which jeopardize public safety on the part of either the pharmaceutical
company or the FDA would not be tolerated.
The congressional hearings also brought critical public attention to the story. While the voluntary withdrawal
of Vioxx created some awareness, congressional participation into the investigation gave a fully developed
glimpse of the situation. Given that there were tens of millions of people prescribed Vioxx, the issue was a
sensitive one for a large number of Americans.
The most important consequence of the congressional hearings, however, was the litany of court cases that
immediately followed. Many legal analysts viewed the hearings as a sort of “dress rehearsal” for the thousands
of Vioxx cases that overwhelmed the justice system. The testimony oﬀered at the hearings provided insight
into the types of arguments to be made by plaintiﬀs as well as Merck in future cases.
Vioxx Litigation
The voluntary recall of Vioxx by Merck and the congressional investigations which followed led to a ﬂood of
lawsuits in both state and federal courts. The immense popularity of Vioxx which brought Merck billions
of dollars in proﬁts has worked against the pharmaceutical giant in the post-market litigation phase. The
40twenty million people who took the arthritis medication are now all potential plaintiﬀs.169 Every day the
company is faced with new law suits from across the country. The future of Merck depends largely on the
company’s ability to contend with its ever growing court docket. Merck is not the ﬁrst company to pull a
product from the market and then suﬀer the litigation consequences. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals pulled
its Bendectin, a morning sickness drug from the market in 1983, after it had been used by over ten million
pregnant women. A similar situation was faced by Dow Corning Company when it was forced to remove
its silicone breast implants from the market in 1992.170 And while Merck is not the ﬁrst company to chart
these rough waters, their course of action is up in the air.
Thus far, four Vioxx cases have been decided. Three of those cases have been state court cases and one case
was decided in federal court. Some analysts argue that Merck will fair best in federal court. Others disagree.
To fully understand the current state of litigation and whether the plaintiﬀs have the edge or whether Merck
is on top, it is best to examine the four cases which have already been tried. Each case brought new facts
and new arguments and each sheds light on the current state of the Vioxx litigation.
Ernst v. Merck
The ﬁrst case to be heard in state court was Ernst v. Merck. The facts of the Ernst case were already
discussed in detail in the introduction to this paper. Robert Ernst was a physically active man who died of a
cardiac arrhythmia and atherosclerosis. He had been taking Vioxx for seven months. His wife, Carol Ernst
ﬁled her suit against Merck in Texas’s 23rd District Court in 2002. She alleged negligent failure to warn of
the dangers associated with the drug and civil conspiracy to conceal that danger.171
Legal analysts believed the Ernst case to be a favorable one for Merck. Because the case was ﬁled in state
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41court, Merck would have the beneﬁt of state law limitations on ﬁnancial liability.172 Texas law has a cap on
punitive damages that does not allow damages to exceed twice the amount rewarded for economic damages.
Also, because Carol and Robert Ernst had been married less than a year when he died, non-economic
damages it was thought would be small. Additionally, Robert Ernst did not suﬀer a prolonged illness, so
economic damages would also likely be relatively miniscule. The most important advantage the Merck team
believed it had going into the Ernst case, however, was the lack of scientiﬁc causation evidence.173
Prior to the beginning of the trial, Kent Jarrell, a spokesperson for Hughes, Hubbard, and Reed, one of the
law ﬁrms representing Merck, commented on the defense team’s position in the case. He stated, “This is not
a normal Vioxx case, which is about heart attacks and storkes being increased by the use of the drug...[The
plaintiﬀ] is going to make this about the behavior of the company. We plan on making it about the speciﬁcs
of causation.”174 Robert Ernst died of cardiac arrhythmia and Merck claimed that no reliable scientiﬁc
evidence had found that Vioxx caused that.175 In their motion for summary judgment, the defense argued
that the plaintiﬀs must “establish to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” that Vioxx probably caused
Mr. Ernst’s fatal cardiac arrhythmia.176 That motion was overruled by the Texas judge.
In a case in which the plaintiﬀ alleges injury due to exposure to a harmful drug as in Ernst, the plaintiﬀ bears
the burden of proof in meeting the causation requirement. The plaintiﬀ must show that he was 1- exposed
to the drug, 2- the drug is capable of causing his injuries (general causation), 3- the exposure caused his
injuries (speciﬁc causation), and 4- the defendant was responsible for the exposure that caused the injury.177
In order to prove general causation, scientiﬁc evidence is presented. In order to prove speciﬁc causation,
scientiﬁc and statistical evidence and testimony are oﬀered.
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42The defense likely would have had a solid opportunity to win on the issue of causation but the plaintiﬀ’s
legal team did not put on a causation case.178 And the jury that heard the Ernst case clearly found that
proof of causation was not necessary.179 Plaintiﬀ lead attorney Mark Lanier commented before trial, “I win
the case whether it is a heart attack or an arrhythmia. Merck internally knew that Vioxx caused both.
Merck knew it before it sold its ﬁrst pill. I don’t have to use outside experts. I will use Merck’s own
documents, their own emails, their own scientists.”180 The plaintiﬀ’s strategy was to prove Merck to be an
irresponsible company that marketed a dangerous product. It seemed that the plaintiﬀ’s legal team didn’t
care about scientiﬁc evidence at all. When asked about the data that suggested Vioxx to be dangerous only
after eighteen months of use, Lanier stated, “That’s just bogus. Vioxx can kill you after 18 months; it can
kill you after six weeks.”181 The defense wanted the case to be judged on its science. The plaintiﬀs wanted
it to be about the bad conduct of Merck. The jury sided with the plaintiﬀs.
The jury awarded Ernst $253.4 million in damages. Of that award, $229 was punitive. Plaintiﬀs had only
asked for $40 million. Merck has appealed the ruling. General Counsel for the company argued that the
jury in the Ernst case was permitted to hear irrelevant evidence that was not based on science.182 The legal
team also argued that the plaintiﬀs did not “meet the standard set by Texas law to prove Vioxx caused Mr.
Ernst’s death.”183
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43The Ernst case is not binding precedent for cases in other state courts. However, the Ernst decision has
clearly shaped the legal battle that has ensued following the August 2005 decision. The Merck legal team
has moved forward with a better understanding of the importance of defending the company’s actions and
reputation as opposed to focusing solely on causation. The plaintiﬀ’s attorneys have vigorously pursued
the jurors in the case to get a better sense of the impressions they had of the case and the arguments
presented.184 Ernst v. Merck was a clear victory for the plaintiﬀs and a major set back for Merck. However,
with thousands of cases yet to be tried and with a legal team eager to learn from their mistakes, Merck’s
fate was hardly sealed by the Ernst defeat.
Humeston v. Merck
Frederick Humeston of Boise, Idaho suﬀered a heart attack in 2001 at age 56. Humeston, a twice wounded
Vietnam, Marine Corps Veteran and postal worker, alleged that Vioxx was to blame for his heart attack.185
He began taking Vioxx as a painkiller after an injury to his right knee.186 He continued to take the drug
when he discovered that it eased the pain in his left knee which had been wounded by shrapnel in Vietnam
and troubled him ever since.187 He only took Vioxx intermittently from May until September of 2001.188
Humeston claimed in his suit against Merck that taking Vioxx caused a blood clot that led to his heart
attack. The Humeston case began on September 12, 2005, prior to the decision in Ernst v. Merck, and
it was the ﬁrst of 2,300 Vioxx cases to be ﬁled jointly in New Jersey Superior Court. Like many of the
other plaintiﬀs, Humeston, an Idaho resident, brought his case to New Jersey because Merck is based out of
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44Whitehouse Station, New Jersey.
The Humeston case ended up being a slam dunk victory for Merck. Legal analysts believe that Merck’s
success in this second state court case had more to do with jury selection and a less sympathetic plaintiﬀ
than it did with legal strategy and evidence.189 The jurors were primarily white middle-class people. The jury
included a teacher, county prosecutor, bank executive, bookkeeper, accountant, and real estate broker.190
These jurors played an important role in this case, not just in the post-trial deliberation but also in their
role as fact ﬁnder due to the allowance of jury questions. Few courts allow juror questions. Judge Carol
Higbee, however, who is presiding over the jointly ﬁled Vioxx cases, has made it a practice ever since New
Jersey judges were given the authority to allow such questions in 2002.191 The juror questions in Humeston
were foreshadowing of the ﬁnal outcome.
The questions posited by the jurors made it immediately clear that they were less concerned with Merck’s
actions and more concerned with whether or not something other than Vioxx led to Humeston’s blood clot
and heart attack. The questions also assured the court that the jurors had focused intently on the evidence
presented. The jurors showered Humeston with questions. They asked him if he ever combined Vioxx with
narcotics.192 He was asked if he ever discussed the side eﬀects of the drug with his doctors.193 Jurors asked
Humeston if the events of September 11th had caused him stress.194 The questions from the jurors came
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45after a long and trying day in which Humeston testiﬁed to the eﬀect of his heart attack on his quality of life.
His testimony was emotional and heart felt but the questions from the jurors made clear that they had very
little sympathy. That sentiment on the part of the jury was evident again when they came to a verdict in
favor of Merck.
Legally, the Humeston case was distinguishable from the Ernst case in that the lawyers for the plaintiﬀs
focused on the science of the case. The decision by lead plaintiﬀ attorney, Christopher Seeger, to place
emphasis on the scientiﬁc issues was viewed by many observers to be a costly error.195 Instead, a wiser
path for Seeger might have been to have followed the example set in the Ernst case and honed the jury’s
attention on the marketing practices of Merck. Additionally, the plaintiﬀ’s team was challenged when Judge
Higbee allowed the admission of portions of a memo by two Food and Drug Administration oﬃcials which
concluded that short-term use of Vioxx caused no greater cardiovascular risk than everyday pain killers.196
The memo only strengthened the scientiﬁc case put forward by the defense. Attorney, Mark Lanier, who
successfully tried the Ernst case commented after the decision in Humeston that it is “hard to try a case
on the science.”197 Lanier went on to note that Humeston was only the second jury trial Seeger had ever
tried.198
In the end, the jury deliberated for eight hours and found 8-1 that Merck had properly alerted prescribing
doctors to the link between Vioxx and increased risk of heart attacks. The only juror to rule against Merck on
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46the failure to warn issue was the only minority on the jury.199 The verdict in favor of Merck was important for
several reasons. The verdict was likely to deter some cases involving short-term users of Vioxx.200 Because
the majority of the science concludes that the greatest risk of cardiovascular events occurred in patients
taking Vioxx for eighteen months or longer, plaintiﬀs such as Humeston who took the drug for only a few
months, are at a disadvantage. The victory for Merck was also immediately felt on Wall Street. Merck
shares rose six percent after the Humeston case.201 Also, the concern over possible collateral estoppel on the
failure to warn issue was eliminated with the Merck victory the case. Had the jury found for the plaintiﬀs on
the failure to warn issue, Merck could have been precluded from retrying the issue in the other New Jersey
Superior Court cases.202 And most importantly, the verdict for Merck gave the pharmaceutical company
back some of the momentum it had lost after the Ernst defeat. The score card was tied up between the
plaintiﬀs and the defendants. The following case was in federal court and it broke the tie.
Plunkett v. Merck
In February of 2005, a seven judge panel consolidated hundreds of individual and class-action lawsuits ﬁled
in federal courts against Merck. The cases were consolidated in a federal court in New Orleans before
Judge Eldon E. Fallon, a judge well liked by the plaintiﬀs’ lawyers.203 In the consolidation order from the
administrative panel, it was stated that the assignment went to Judge Fallon because he had both the time
and the experience needed to fulﬁll the duty.204 Just the year before, Judge Fallon had presided over all the
federal injury claims which stemmed from the Propulsid litigation. Propulsid was a heartburn medication
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47that was linked to eighty deaths and over 100 heart attacks before it was removed from the market in 2000.205
Given his oversight of that expansive litigation, Judge Fallon was viewed by the panel as strong choice. It
should be noted that due to Hurricane Katrina’s toll on the city of New Orleans, Judge Fallon’s court was
moved temporarily to Houston, Texas. So once again, Merck found itself in a Texas courtroom.
Many analysts believe that the upper hand in federal court belongs to Merck. The reason for this upper hand
is due in large part to the federal rules involving scientiﬁc evidence. The 1993 Supreme Court decision in
William Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals created a two part test for admitting scientiﬁc evidence in
federal cases. In order to be admitted scientiﬁc testimony must, 1- convey scientiﬁc knowledge and 2- it must
be relevant.206 The Supreme Court explained “scientiﬁc knowledge” to mean knowledge that it is grounded
in methods and procedures of science that is more than just subjective speculation.207 Under Daubert federal
judges are charged as “gatekeepers” and are given the authority to determine what scientiﬁc evidence can
be presented in drug and medical device tort cases.208 Federal judges must examine scientiﬁc evidence and
ultimately admit only that evidence that meets the two pronged Daubert test. This is important for Merck
particularly in cases of short-term Vioxx use (eighteen months or less) where the strongest scientiﬁc evidence
is believed to be on Merck’s side. Therefore, many legal analysts believe that Merck would be well served
to move as many state actions to the federal level as possible.209 The Plunkett case was the ﬁrst case to be
tried in federal court and it was decided in Merck’s favor.
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48The Plunkett case began in December of 2005. The plaintiﬀ, Evelyn Irvin Plunkett was married to Richard
Irvin. Richard Irvin approached his physician in April 2001 with complaints of back strain he suﬀered while
working for a seafood wholesaler in St. Augustine, Florida.210 His doctor prescribed Vioxx for the pain. One
month later, Irvin was found by his co-workers dead at his desk, having suﬀered a heart attack.211 His widow
claimed her husband was in excellent health. However, autopsy reports found that Irvin had moderate to
severely clogged arteries.212 The autopsy also showed a blood clot in a major coronary artery which caused
an irregular heartbeat. Evelyn Plunkett claimed that the blood clot was caused by her husband’s Vioxx
use.213
The Plunkett case lasted only two weeks before it went to the jury.214 On December 12, 2005, after four
days of deliberations, Judge Fallon declared a mistrial.215 The jury was unable to decide whether Merck
was liable for the death of Richard Irvin and whether the company failed to issue safety warnings regarding
Vioxx’s potential cardiovascular risks.216 The case was rescheduled for February 2006.
The second Plunkett case was heard in the originally selected New Orleans Federal Court room and it ended
in a critical victory for Merck. The trial again lasted approximately two weeks and hinged on the short
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49period of time Evelyn Plunkett’s husband, Richard Irvin took Vioxx. The plaintiﬀ’s legal team argued that
it was Vioxx’s enzyme blocking capability which even after only a few weeks of use led to the blood clot.
Merck’s defense defeated that argument. Legal analysts believe that Merck was given the advantage in
Plunkett after Judge Fallon ruled that two of the plaintiﬀ’s chief experts, a cardiologist and a pathologist,
would not be allowed to testify that Vioxx was to blame for Irvin’s heart attack.217 The judge decided that
while the doctors were experts in their respective ﬁelds, they were not experts on Vioxx.218 The ruling was
a clear indication that Judge Fallon would strictly observe his gatekeeper role under Daubert. It seems that
the bottom line in the Plunkett case was that heart attacks are common and it will require a lot of strong
scientiﬁc evidence to prove that Vioxx caused a particular heart attack. A lawyer for Merck commented after
the Plunkett trial that the jury had found, “Merck scientists lived up to their legal and ethical responsibilities
when manufacturing and marketing Vioxx.”219 The jury deliberated for three hours and forty minutes, the
shortest time of any of the previous trials.
The victory in Plunkett case was another boost for the Merck legal team. Again, the case served as a deterrent
to plaintiﬀs considering bringing claims against Merck involving only short term Vioxx use. The win for
Merck could also serve the company well if there is a future settlement of the federal cases consolidated under
Judge Fallon.220 And importantly, the Plunkett case was the ﬁrst tried in federal court and the victory for
Merck, in many ways set the tone for future federal court cases.
Cona/McDarby v. Merck
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50The next case, and the most recently decided case, brought Merck back to state court in New Jersey.
Cona/McDarby involved the claims of two plaintiﬀs whose cases were combined into one by Judge Carol
Higbee. Merck strongly protested the combining of the plaintiﬀs’ claims and urged the judge to hear each
case on its own merits.221 Plaintiﬀs’ attorneys favored the consolidation because it would allow for more
cases to be heard sooner.222 Judge Higbee grouped Cona’s and McDarby’s claims because they were similar
in facts and length of time each plaintiﬀ took Vioxx.223 Unlike the previous New Jersey case, both plaintiﬀs
claimed to have taken Vioxx for over eighteen months. The jury in the case split the verdict rejecting the
claim of one plaintiﬀ and awarding compensation to the other.
John McDarby, a seventy-seven year old from Park Ridge, New Jersey suﬀered a heart attack in his living
room and broke his hip as a result.224 McDarby is now conﬁned to a wheelchair. He claimed to have taken
Vioxx for four years prior to his heart attack. Thomas Cona, sixty years old from Cherry Hill, New Jersey,
was a business man and was struck down by a heart attack on a golf course. Cona claimed to have taken
Vioxx for two years but could only produce three prescriptions for Vioxx for those two years.225 After a ﬁve
week trial and fourteen hours of deliberations, the jury awarded $3 million to John McDarby in compensatory
damages and $1.5 million to his wife Irma, for loss of services.226 The jury, however, denied damages to
Thomas Cona.227 For both plaintiﬀs, it was found that Merck committed consumer fraud in marketing
Vioxx to doctors, Merck made misleading misrepresentations, and Merck intentionally omitted data linking
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51Vioxx to increased risk of heart attacks.228 The decision to refuse compensatory damages to Cona was likely
due to his inability to prove the length of time he took Vioxx. Following the initial trial, a three day punitive
damages trial ensued to allow jurors to determine if there was “clear and convincing evidence that Merck
withheld material information about Vioxx from the Food and Drug Administration and that its conduct
was deliberately meant to harm.”229 The jury came to an aﬃrmative answer on that question and awarded
$9 million to McDarby in punitive damages.230
McDarby’s attorney Robert Gorden of the New York ﬁrm Weitz and Luxemburg noted that this was the ﬁrst
punitive damages verdict brought down against a pharmaceutical company since the passage of New Jersey’s
1995 Product Liability Act.231 Under that act punitive damages are capped at ﬁve times the compensatory
damages award. Therefore the award could have been as high as $22.5 million.
Merck attorneys claimed that at no time was improper data ever provided to the FDA. They went on to
argue that the jury in the Cona/McDarby case was permitted to hear “irrelevant and prejudicial” information
from the plaintiﬀs’ lawyers.232 Merck vowed to appeal the judgment and would focus their appeal on the
restrictions placed on them in presenting evidence to the jury.233 Cona/McDarby again emphasized the
point that in regards to the admission of evidence, state courts would not be friendly to the Merck cause.
The decision in Cona/McDarby was a divided victory for both Merck and the plaintiﬀs’ team and it therefore
did not send a clear message to either side. The verdict did, however, make several important statements
in regard to future litigation. First, Merck’s initial worries over consolidation were likely valid given that
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52the jury split its decision even though it was a case of similar facts and plaintiﬀs. Therefore, Merck will be
better served if future cases are not consolidated. Also, the verdict indicated that there is no clear precedent
regarding the issue of failure to warn.234 Merck had been cleared on that issue in two previous cases but lost
on it in Cona/McDarby. And although Merck was slapped with punitive damages, given that the damages
could have been as high as $22.5, the $9 million awarded does not reﬂect the kind of anger on the part of
the jury as was seen in the Ernst case in Texas. The Cona/McDarby decision was a mixed signal for both
sides and did not provide a clear path to success for future litigation.
Future Predictions for Vioxx Litigation
Merck has vowed to try each case and appeal each loss it faces in regards to Vioxx. In a recent disclosure,
however, Merck revealed that the number of lawsuits it must defend has gone from 9,500 three months ago to
over 11,000.235 Merck also faces a large class action lawsuit ﬁled on behalf of health care providers, unions,
and insurers suing to recover losses they incurred from purchasing the drug for employer health plans.236
Merck vows to appeal the class certiﬁcation.237 At the time of the Cona/McDarby verdict, Merck had won
two state cases (including the Cona verdict) and lost two. Merck also won the only federal trial thus far. In
the cases it did lose, Merck was ordered to pay over $200 million in damages to plaintiﬀs and their heirs.238
Yet, a large, global settlement does not seem to be on the radar screen. It seems that Merck, at this point, is
still relatively conﬁdent that it can win enough cases to keep it viable. While the Merck defeats thus far have
been major, their victories have sustained them. And it appears that Merck intends to continue ﬁghting for
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53important victories even if that means suﬀering through more loses.
Given the way the cases have played out thus far, Merck will be best served by carefully choosing the cases it
decides to pursue and by picking favorable jurisdictions. The more cases Merck lawyers can move to federal
court the better oﬀ the company will be. From the plaintiﬀ perspective, the opposite is true. The strongest
venue for plaintiﬀs will continue to be state courts where the rules of evidence are relaxed. The themes
in the cases should remain relatively similar to those that have already been tried because, as mentioned
earlier, no clear precedent has been set on any of the major issues. As always, momentum will be a key
issue for both sides. To this point, the litigation score has seesawed between the two sides. In the future if
the plaintiﬀs’ bar achieves several key victories in short order, a settlement will be much more likely. Or if
Merck manages such a feat, many plaintiﬀs will be likely to drop their claims. If however, the future cases
are anything like the cases already tried, juries will continue to split between the two sides which will only
prolong the litigation chapter of the Vioxx story.
Concluding Thoughts
After careful examination of the entire Vioxx story, placing blame on only one actor is diﬃcult if not
impossible. Missteps, poor judgment, and misplaced priorities plagued both Merck and the FDA. There
were multiple actions by both organizations that should have been done diﬀerently.
Merck should have completed much larger and more thorough studies of Vioxx to determine speciﬁc details
regarding Vioxx’s safety and eﬃcacy. Those studies should have been done prior to submitting the drug
to the FDA for review and approval. Another misstep on the part of Merck happened when results of the
VIGOR trial were available. Merck’s claim that Vioxx’s heightened cardiovascular event numbers were the
54sole eﬀect of naproxen’s protective eﬀect was merely a way of rationalizing what were clearly adverse study
ﬁndings. Also, in its dealings with the FDA, Merck does not appear to have been upfront about their study
ﬁndings and often waited weeks and months to make critical data available. And while Merck did voluntarily
pull the drug from the market without an order from the FDA, it is arguable that the withdrawal was long
overdue. To go even further it could be said that Vioxx should have never been placed on the market to
begin with.
The FDA too should shoulder its share of criticism for the handling of Vioxx. As pointed out on numerous
occasions during the congressional hearings on the subject, the FDA willingly reviewed and approved Vioxx
on the basis of very little data and safety information. The FDA’s Arthritis Committee was so pleased
with the notion that the drug would lower gastrointestinal events that it all but ignored the possibility of
other health consequences. The FDA should have refused to consider review of Vioxx until more extensive
research was completed. If the FDA had waited for the results of the VIGOR study before accepting Vioxx
for review, it might not have been approved at that time and many lives would have been saved. Also, like
Merck, the FDA did not move speedily when negative result were received. From the time it received the
ﬁrst troubling ﬁgures regarding the increased risk of heart attack in Vioxx users, there was almost a two
year delay before any warning to consumers was placed on the drug. That delay is inexcusable.
The Vioxx debacle is a situation that could have easily been avoided. As mentioned, a requirement of large
and expansive studies on every drug submitted to the FDA for approval would have changed the course
of the Vioxx story. Moreover, priority review should be reserved for only those drugs meant speciﬁcally
55to treat life-threatening illnesses. It seems clear that the FDA has relaxed the requirements for a drug to
receive expedited review and approval which is likely to hurt public safety rather than help it. Also, as
suggested by several of the witnesses at the congressional hearings, an independent FDA oﬃce with the sole
mission of monitoring the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs already approved for market use would greatly reduce
the likelihood of a similar situation in the future. Because the independent oﬃce would not be responsible
for approving the drugs and would only monitor drugs post-approval, the conﬂict of interest that appears
to plague the FDA now would be eliminated. In addition to these reforms there should also be improved
communication between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the FDA. In the Vioxx situation, Merck and
the FDA scheduled meetings and phone calls and inevitably most were delayed or cancelled. There must
be an understanding between both parties that the priority is public safety and in order to protect public
safety, eﬀective and respectful communications between the manufacturer and the FDA is critical.
The bottom line in the Vioxx saga is that an unsafe drug was put on the market and remained there long
enough to aﬀect the health and wellbeing of thousands and maybe millions of users. It was a drug that
showed tremendous promise in that it would likely reduce the stomach problems similar drugs had caused in
the past. That beneﬁt was so appealing however, that Vioxx’s serious ﬂaws were ignored. It is vital to fully
understand what happened in the story of Vioxx because only with full knowledge of the various mistakes
and problems that took place is it possible to prevent them in the future.
56